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Resources - Missions (Overseas)
August 2000
Solomon Islands: Ethnicity or
Economics
Julian Treadaway
In the middle of the night last June Malakia (the name has been changed)
and his family were woken suddenly by a group of men and boys armed with
home made guns, resurrected World War 2 weapons, machetes and axes.
Malakia was a settler from Malaita, the most populated island of the
Solomon Islands, who had bought ‘customary’ land in the larger but less
populated island of Guadalcanal. He and his family had built a small
village of sago-palm leaf houses next to a placid river and lived
peacefully with their Guadalcanal neighbours for over 20 years. The
armed men were from the Isatabu Freedom Movement, who had decided there
were too many settlers in Guadalcanal and that they should be chased
out, whether they were legal settlers who had bought the land like
Malakia or illegal squatters like many others.
They told Malakia and his family that they had 24 hours to leave or they
would be back to burn the village and kill its inhabitants. The next day
Malakia and his family packed as many of their few possessions as they
could, and found a truck to take them to Honiara, the capital city, also
on Guadalcanal. There they found themselves in a sports hall already
crowded with refugees. They soon heard that the ‘militants’, as everyone
had started to call them, had come back and carried out their threat of
burning down the village, but only after they had safely left.
Over a period of about 6 months about 20,000 people were expelled from
Guadalcanal in this way. Some were prosperous farmers who had bought the
land legally and invested in modern houses, solar electricity and
commercial pig or chicken farms; many were workers on the large palm-oil
plantations where most of the workers were from outside Guadalcanal;
others were squatters who had settled without permission, often near
relatives or just outside the Honiara town boundary.
The press, echoing the ‘ethnic cleansing’ concepts of the Balkans and
elsewhere, have called this ‘ethnic tension’, but many aspects of what
happened suggest this is misleading.
First, there was very little violence considering the scale of the
exodus – less than 20 people were killed. If the situation was caused by
ethnic hatreds people would not have been given the time to leave
peacefully.
Secondly it is not only Malaitans who have been expelled but also
settlers and workers from many other islands – it looked anti-Malaitan
because the majority of the settlers were Malaitan, and Malaitans form
the biggest single group in the Solomon Islands population.
In fact the problem is one of the distribution of land and resources
rather than just an ethnic problem. Malaitans and others have freely
‘bought’ land in North Guadalcanal and many have become prosperous. The
large plantations are foreign and government owned and the original
landowners get very little share of the profits. Many of the ‘freedom
fighters’ are young men from the other side of Guadalcanal, which has
fewer resources and has been neglected, like many other rural areas of
the Solomons, by successive governments. The young men, often people
‘pushed out’ of school by the lack of places in the school system, see
others becoming prosperous: the settlers; the plantation owners and
workers; their fellow islanders who have made money from selling their
land; the urban elite living on Guadalcanal land; and the politicians
they have elected into parliament. They started to ask why they were not
getting a share of the wealth. This is a situation repeated in many
other parts of the Solomons and perhaps it exploded here first because
the ‘wealth gap’ was more extreme and more conspicuous, and because of
special factors such as the presence of Bougainville refugees who had
already faced a similar situation in Papua New Guinea.
Another aspect is the conflict between traditional concepts of land
ownership in which, even if you pay for land, it remains ultimately the
property of the ‘original’ landowners, and European concepts of selling
land ‘freehold’ and forever. There is also the patrilineal land
ownership system in Malaita and the matrilineal system in Guadalcanal,
so that a Malaita man marrying a Guadalcanal woman ‘inherits’ land from
both sides.
In addition there are many social factors underlying the situation. As
in many countries, the education system had been based on an academic
pyramid, with large numbers of ‘push-outs’ who have learnt academic
skills suitable for urban employment rather than skills useful for rural
living, to which most must return. The education system, the media,
including 3 commercial FM radio stations, and videos, which now
penetrate into almost every village, help to give these young people
expectations and glimpses of life styles which they envy but cannot
possibly hope to achieve. The videos also show all the techniques of
armed, masked men, kidnapping, holding people at gun point, hi-jacking
vehicles, tolerance of violence and use of drugs which have now been
used by the two militant groups. Even the name of one, the Malaita Eagle
Force, reminds one of the videos.
Added to this are historical factors such as the British encouragement
for Malaitans to migrate rather than develop their own island, so that
young Malaitans became migrants from the days of when they were taken to
Queensland by the ‘blackbirders’. This led to the Malaitans being the
entrepreneurs in many areas and, as so often happens, their initiative
came to be resented by others.
The situation, therefore, is far more complex than the simple’ ethnic
tension’ of media headlines.
For a while the situation got much worse, with the Malaita Eagle Force
arming themselves with stolen police guns and returning to Guadalcanal
to demand ‘compensation’ for their loss of land. Recently this group
joined forces with discontented paramilitary elements of the police and
an ambitious lawyer/politician to take over Honiara, surround the Prime
Minister with a ‘protective force’ of armed men and demand his
resignation. Partly under international pressure the Prime Minister was
freed so that his final resignation had a semblance of
constitutionality, rather than brute force.
There was a period of skirmishing, rather than open warfare, outside
Honiara, but reports of this were very exaggerated, especially overseas
– perhaps one reason why the Australians decided to evacuate all their
nationals and others who wanted to leave. Even before they all left,
however, the two militant groups had agreed to a truce, a strong women’s
group has pleaded with them as mothers to stop fighting, and at the end
of June some of the Malaita Eagle Force crossed the bridge between their
bunker and the Isatabu Freedom Fighters and shared food with them.
Another group of women are now regularly going to the ‘border’ and
meeting women from the other side and exchanging food with them – a very
Melanesian gesture.
It looks as if the two sides do not want to fight as long as they get
their compensation, an amnesty and other demands. This is not easy, but
again indicates that it is not essentially an ethnic conflict. Meanwhile
we await the election of a new Prime Minister by Parliament, now
scheduled for 28 June. Unless the new Prime Minister tackles the
underlying problems, however, the situation may simmer and break out
again, even if he gets the two warring sides to make the truce
permanent.
The fundamental question is whether the Solomon Islands allows modern
trends to continue, including migration between islands, modern land
purchase, inter-marriage, multicultural schools and a mixed public
service which can be posted to any island. These are the trends which
are slowly making a nation of Solomon Islands. The pressures against
these trends are now great. There are already demands from most
provinces for the introduction of ‘pass laws’ to restrict the movement
of people. The danger of this in a country of 400, 000 people with over
70 language/cultural groups is that it would result in a return to the
nineteenth century situation of division into tiny, hostile ethnic
groups, and perhaps the revival of ‘tribal’ fighting with modern
weapons, as has already happened in parts of Papua New Guinea.
Here, as elsewhere in Melanesia, the only viable alternative, given the
economic and social changes which have already taken place, is to move
forward towards nation building, perhaps within a federal structure,
rather than return to the ethnic isolation of the past. Most of the more
educated people realise this, but the ‘militants do not, and this is
exploited by ambitious politicians. Many of the young militants are also
there because they enjoy the violence and because their guns have for
the first time given them a status in their society and power over their
elders, which they will not easily give up. Whatever the future holds
the road is going to be a long and hard one for a country known as the
“Happy Isles”.
In our view Julian gives a good background and assessment of the current
problems in Solomon Islands. Obviously, not all aspects of the problem
have been included, as the situation is very complex indeed. On Friday
30 June, the government elected a new Prime Minister, Mr Mannasah
Sogovare, the former leader of the opposition. His first undertaking was
to outline a 100-day plan during which time the following results were
targeted:
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The return of law and order to the police.
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The militants on both sides to return all weapons
and cease hostility.
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The resumption of schools and other government
services
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The resumption of international services to
Honiara.
Sogovare was elected by the members of parliament, but does not hold a
majority and therefore his political position is shaky. The whole
country will need to get behind him in order to achieve these goals.
Needed is much wisdom, humility and a willingness to move forward and
forgive the past on all sides. We request much prayer for Solomon
Islands, and particularly for the Christian Churches and Missions who
may have leading roles to play.
Kevin & Machi Rietveld.
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